Interstoff (launched in 1959 by Messe Frankfurt) and Première Vision (launched in 1972 in Lyon) became ''information dissemination gathering locations'' for the fashion and textile industries all over the world. The two events mobilized the fashion prediction methodology as a key tool to impose themselves as the favorite information gatekeeper for the industry. Their goal was to complement the trading of goods with the exchange of adequate and strategic information for companies that were dramatically constrained by immediate global competition and rapidly changing seasonal models. As a result the two trade fairs progressively adopted a new information-centric model and contributed to maintain Western Europe as the central location for the dissemination of fashion trends worldwide. Messe Frankfurt also pursued an alternative geographical strategy. It did this by following the global relocation of textile manufacturing and setting up fairs around the world, particularly in China, before ultimately ending the Interstoff event in Frankfurt in 1999.
Introduction
The clothing and fashion industry has been radically transformed on a global scale over the last four decades (Kawamura 2004) . Indeed, low-cost manufacturing across the world has challenged even the most advanced clothing industries in North America, Japan, and Western Europe. The European fashion industry, however, has survived against the odds (Pouillard 2013) . In fact, it has been able to transform itself over the years, shifting its focus away from manufacturing to high valueadding activities in the international fashion industry, such as marketing, branding, and design. What is more, value chains have been broken up, and transnational manufacturing and service networks have emerged (Adikari and Yamamoto 2007) . Only recently, though, have scholars emphasized the active role of intermediaries in this consolidation process (Blaszczyk 2007) .
The market for textile suppliers became increasingly competitive in the early 1970s, with newcomers from low-cost countries, particularly in Asia, joining the fray. Production costs in Europe had grown steadily in the 1960s to sustain the development of public services. Incomes in Europe had also increased due to shortages in the labor market and neocorporatist arrangements (Eichengreen 2007) . As a result, the labor-intensive European textile industry increasingly started to outsource its production or, alternatively, went bankrupt. Despite its innovative nature, with the introduction of many new fibers and manufacturing techniques in the 1950s and 60s, the industry eventually, and rapidly, lost ground during the 1970s and 1980s (Lindner 2001) .
One of the industry's important counterstrategies was to internationalize and specialize. Fashion and textile fairs became important intermediaries, as they provided ''nodal points in the global fashion business, located at particular interfaces in the value chain'' (Skov 2006, p. 765) . According to Bathelt and Henn (2012, p. 1) , trade fairs are ''temporary gatherings based on physical proximity which can support interactions between economic agents. They play an important role for processes of inter-firm communication, learning and the corresponding creation and dissemination of knowledge.'' After World War II, two European fashion textile trade fairs, Interstoff and Première Vision, became the most important temporary gatherings for the continent's textile industry. Interstoff was launched in Frankfurt in 1959 as a new venture by Ausstellungs-und Messegesellschaft mbH (renamed Messe Frankfurt GmbH in 1983) . The event was acknowledged as the number one textile fair in the world for almost 40 years, although it lost its prime position in the European fabric fair business at the end of the 1990s. Simultaneously, though, it gained new prominence on a global scale, including in Paris. Meanwhile, in Frankfurt, organizers still hold the successful national technical textile shows, Heimtextil and Techtextil. In 2012, for example, Messe Frankfurt was managing 23 textile fairs globally, including Intertextile apparel fabric shows on China's mainland, where the number of exhibitors dwarfs that of all such shows previously organized.
Even though Interstoff was acclaimed as the best place to exhibit textiles during the 1960s, high-end French silk manufacturers were not convinced that the fair offered the select environment their products deserved. So, in 1972, 15 silk entrepreneurs from Lyon decided to put on an event where they could present their new products and lines to specific clients, notably those from Parisian haute couture houses. Première Vision was therefore launched as an associative venture in Lyon, before moving to Paris two years later. Since 1985, it has combined making fashion predictions and fabric sales, and its main focus is European manufacturers. This event increased competitiveness, while also reducing marketing and selling costs for small and medium-sized European textile manufacturers, particularly Italian firms. The weakness of the Première Vision strategy, however, was its major dependence on Italian manufacturers. So, from the 2000s onwards, this Parisian fair has also pursued a global strategy, and now organizes shows on several continents.
This article compares the evolution of Interstoff and Première Vision. It addresses the following questions: To what extent were these two businesses embedded within the industrial sector? What were the origins and results of their diametrically-opposed strategies? And what was the role of their ownership and management structures?
Scholars from different disciplines analyze trade fairs from various perspectives. Economists like Rychen and Zimmermann (2008) regard them as neutral locations, but sociologists and historians insist they are knowledge-based with a number of attributes, like the opportunity to foster business and cultural encounters (Bathelt, Rinallo, and Golfetto 2014; Seringhaus and Rosson 1994; Skov 2006) . Meanwhile, two marketing scholars, Rinallo and Golfetto (2011, p. 454) , suggest that trade fairs are ''temporary clusters because they form central relational spaces for knowledge and market processes in the global economy.'' In an article published in 2006, they used a macromeso-micro analysis to suggest that the reason for the success of Première Vision was the organization of what they termed a ''concertation mechanism.'' According to these authors, the ''making of'' fashion trends has to be understood as a collective and well-organized process. They debunk the common notion that fashion is an exclusively creative process initiated by over-the-top designers whose brilliant ideas make clothes appear overnight. Although this mechanism was not new to the French fashion industry, as it had been part of fashion prediction methodology since the mid-1950s (Maillet 2013) , it was the first time it could be precisely located in a specific place, such as a trade fair. What is more, the theoretical findings of Rinallo and Golfetto are based on the complementary approach of representation in a post-modern world: ''trade fairs are hyperreal representations of the markets they refer to'' (Rinallo and Golfetto 2006, p. 865) . In using such a theoretical framework, the authors position the concertation mechanism as ''a progression of simulations'' led by ''the consensual nature of the 'concertation' process which is supported by national Trade associations representing their members' interests'' (Rinallo and Golfetto 2006, p. 865) . This article discusses the common idea that fashion fairs are ''temporary locations of knowledge pipelines'' (Maskell, Barthlet, and Malmberg 2006) that permit the arrival at consensual opinions, sometimes using a concertation mechanism.
This article will also show that studying trade fair competitors gains from both a multi-level understanding of the businesses themselves and a historical perspective. Trade fairs are the expression of a local or national aim, and form part of an international competitive environment. In other words, international trade fairs can also be seen as a form of political expansion from a national base (Cordente-Rodriguez, Mondejar-Jimenez, and Gázquez-Abad 2011). Moreover, the diverging evolutions of Première Vision and Interstoff cannot be summarized as the success of the former and the failure of the latter, and the story also cannot be solely explained by a concertation mechanism. This article uses the business history perspective of Fridenson and Scranton (2013) to explain the different outcomes of two diametrically opposed business strategies. This new approach ''seeks to sketch a prospective historiography, signaling the possibility of novel questions, voiced and positioned beyond familiar queries, flowing out from times to spaces of rupture'' (Fridenson and Scranton 2013, p. 9) . Furthermore, these two historians insist that periodization is a ''(necessary) constraint'' (Fridenson and Scranton 2013, pp. 22-26) . The U.S. historian Alfred D. Chandler established the field of business history (Chandler 1962 ) around the study of major American companies. In 1990, Chandler added German and British firms to his historical analysis and made an international comparison, although his main interest remained the (big) firm itself (Chandler 1990 ). Fridenson and Scranton, however, invited scholars to study beyond the firm and look at both internal and external influences, including those that had long been regarded as peripheral or complementary. Even though the study of trade fairs is not new for textile historians (Gayot 2001) , parallel research into the fashion industry in the second part of the 20th century has not yet been performed.
This new approach also stresses the role of information that is central to the networks that are, in Fridenson and Scranton's (2013, p. 182) words, ''a thick soup of intentions, arrangements and connections that facilitated business activity.'' At the start of the 20th century, Chandler co-edited an important book with Cortada on the role of information and how it has shaped the U.S. from colonial times to the present day (Chandler and Cortada 2000) . In underlining the crucial role of information in building-up a nation, the two men inspired other business historians who have since expanded on the role of the press, technology, and, particularly, information. According to Chandler and Cortada (2000, p. 298) : ''Information has been and remains an almost invisible part of the economic infrastructure of the nation . . . '' Trade fairs are central locations for diffusing information. The comparative historical analysis of two major trade fairs therefore belongs to this new school of business history school, which views exploring the role of information in the global economic process as crucial (Fridenson and Scranton 2013) .
The sources used for this article were twofold. From 2010 to 2013, interviews were held with senior managers and those responsible for fashion prediction at Première Vision. In 2013 and 2014, interviews were conducted at Interstoff with some former managers and the former head of trend tables in the 1980s and 1990s. Written documents like company archives and press materials (Première Vision: 1972 and Interstoff: 1945 -2000 have revealed that circulating information was a key element in the activities of the two businesses. The management teams of both were determined to quickly communicate their new activities to their clients and the press. In response, and as a countermove to its competitor's initiative, the one lagging behind would try to communicate its (re)actions as quickly as possible. Understanding this interaction of action and reaction relies on the study of information flows between each company and its environment. Analyzing the archives has thus been conducted within the context of the broader evolution of the textile and fashion industries in Europe from 1970-2010. While traditional businesses have suffered since the mid-1970s due to new competitors from developing countries, some companies have been able to adapt and expand their activities by using trade fairs as an important survival tool.
Textile and Fashion Fairs Have a Long Tradition in Europe
Trade fairs have a long tradition dating back to the late Middle Ages and early trade-based capitalism (Florio 1994) . The French historian Gerard Gayot referred to Adam Smith when he stated that it was: ''the Invisible Hand which guided the Merchants to the Leipzig Trade Fairs'' (Gayot 2001, p. 72) . Gayot insisted that the role of trade fairs was as ''a dedicated profit-making location for the merchants.'' Nevertheless, the industrialization of textile production in Western Europe, and the rise of wholesalers and department stores in growing urban centers, changed the distribution model of this production (Smith 2002) . Two major European textile trade fairs in Leipzig (Germany) and Beaucaire (Southern France) did not last beyond the middle of the 19th century, and were replaced by the wholesale business model where merchants now did not have to move and sell their goods directly (Léon 1953) . New kinds of financing and transport also gave confidence to manufacturers and retailers, who were now able to form distant relationships versus the face-to-face versions that were common previously (Chapman 1992) . What is more, along with the novel forms of finance and transport and the industrialization of textiles in the 19th century, ''samples were a new method of marketing'' (Gayot 2000, p. 10) .
Collected together in catalogues, glued with care on to display advertisements or exhibition posters, distributed by hand in the street at the entrance of shops, these samples had no longer only the single objective of testing the market, in order to find an exclusive destination or client, or achieve the final objective, sales (Gayot 2000, p. 10 ).
Yet, international face-to-face contact in business resurfaced in the mid-19th century by way of national and universal exhibitions. Indeed, above the industrialization process and diffusion of new communication tools (Chandler and Cortada 2000) , face-to-face relationships were recognized as essential to the development of business. From the start of these exhibitions, trade fairs moved from regional cities located on trading routes (Leipzig in Germany, Beaucaire in France) to major capitals like Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, London, and Paris (Harvey 1996) . The purpose of these fairs was not only to enable face-to-face encounters, but to also allow attendees to be part of the new major European centers where consumption and trend-setting were taking place (Charle 2009 ).
The universal exhibitions played a major role in the fashion industry, particularly for the haute couture sector. Indeed, the well-known founder of the first haute couture house, CharlesFrederick Worth, an Englishman in Paris, presented his work at the first universal exhibition in London in 1851, and then at the second event in Paris in 1855 (Wilks 1955) . If he had not received confirmation of his talent from the many visitors to the two exhibitions, Worth may not have launched his couture house in Paris in 1860 with the support of an investor. As trade fairs, the universal exhibitions were also ''temporary gatherings based on physical proximity which can support interactions between economic agents'' (Bathelt and Henn 2012) .
At the start of the 20th century, the first presentations of fashion collections were organized in London (1901) and Paris (1908) by haute couture houses (Evans 2013; Jans 2001) . Since the end of the trade fairs in the 19th century, these presentations had become unique events for the fashion industry, especially in Paris (Steele 1988) . In fact, until the interwar period, the textile and fashion industries did not have any other uniquely dedicated events. Fashion presentations during national exhibitions like the one in 1937 in Paris, and the first use of the term ''Prêt à porter'' (Ready-to-Wear), are early examples of the success of modern textile fairs (Lanzmann and Ripert 1992) .
After the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were established in 1949, a struggle ensued over the heritage of the Messe Leipzig trade fair, which was by then located behind the iron curtain and therefore no longer appropriate as a central European trading center. In the early 1950s, the Messe in Frankfurt was competing well with the fairs organized in Hannover and Cologne, although the latter two were subsidized by the states of Niedersachsen and North-Rhine Westphalia. As a result, the Messe-und Ausstellungs-Gesellschaft applied for a subsidy from the State of Hesse. When the German car industry decided to move its international annual automobile fair (IAA) from Berlin to Frankfurt in 1951, the state chose to invest in the Messe company, acquiring a 5 million DM share of the firm. The City of Frankfurt followed suit, acquiring 10 million shares. In 1952, the total capital was increased to 25 million DM to finance the business's expansion plans. The two shareholders thereafter increased their stakes by 5 million, with the former eventually acquiring 40% (10 million) and the latter 60% (15 million). This was a proportionate distribution between two public entities that endures today (Bauer 2009 ). Messe's aims were unchanged in this period:
To stimulate the German and Rhine and Main economy through the organization of fairs and exhibitions and marketing at home and abroad. To reach its targets the company maintains fair and exhibition facilities which its rents against adequate tariffs (Bauer 2009, p. 117) .
Interstoff Becomes the Place to Be, 1959 Be, -1972 The number of textile participants at the general consumption goods fairs organized in the spring and fall by Messe Frankfurt had expanded enormously since 1948. In 1955, an Australian journal wrote that the textile industry was increasingly focused on the International Fair in Frankfurt, which had become the largest such event in Europe, with more than 100 textile exhibitors and 30,000 m 2 of exhibition space (Bauer 2009 ). By 1959, the textile part of these fairs had become so large that the managers of the events decided to separate them according to specific products. As a result, one fair would be dedicated to fabric (clothing textiles) from 1959 onwards (see Figure 1 ). This event was named Interstoff, which was a contraction of Inter for International and Stoff, which means textile in German. This new fair first took place July 7-10, 1959, and was supported by fabric manufacturers and small to medium-sized firms from Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands that produced inexpensive ''ready-to-wear'' clothing (HAMF 1959, p. 5) . The exhibitors were located in uniformly-sized booths, where they showed off their fabrics and had meetings with potential buyers. The fair was a huge success right from the start. Its international character was underlined by the fact that during the first event, 83 exhibitors from seven nations met 2,600 buyers from 31 countries (see Table 1 ).
At the same time as Messe Frankfurt was setting up Interstoff, Italian and French textile trade unions also wanted to get in on the act and launch their own trade fairs. In 1957, the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) had a dual and combined effect. The lowering of import taxes was an incentive for manufacturers to export their goods, and for their representatives, the trade associations, to help them organize new export-oriented trade fairs (Rinallo and Golfetto 2011) . In July 1957, the Italian Center for Fashion in Milan (Centro Italiano della Moda di Milano) organized MITAM (Mercato Internazionale del Tessile per l'Abbligliamento -the International Fair for Textile and Clothes), which was the very first specialist European textile fair. The executives of the textile and fashion industries had wanted to take advantage of the old and famous Milanese fair, which had been launched in 1920 (April 12-27) and then took place every year on the same dates, except from 1942 to 1945 (Interview Lovati 2013).
Milan had become an international hub for fashion after World War II, and MITAM was part of a new Milanese fashion and textile ecosystem (Merlo and Polese 2006; Paris 2010) . The first event attracted visitors from the traditional fashion countries (France, the US, and the UK). Nevertheless, it was clearly conceived to foster Italian production. During the second edition in January 1958, only 4% of its exhibitors were foreign, although a third of its visitors came from abroad, with 50% percent of them traveling from Germany and its neighbors (Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium).
Meanwhile, the French trade organization Union des Industries Textiles launched its first International Textile Market (Marche´Textile International, MTI) in June 1959, two weeks prior to the first Interstoff event. The launch of these three competitive fairs (Frankfurt, Milan, and Paris) at the end of the 1950s can be seen as an important turning point. European textile manufacturers were eager to expand because their fashion clients were looking for innovative products. The three new fairs were all planned for the end of June or the start of July to enable attendees to prepare for the fashion season 18 months in advance since the spring and summer collections had to be delivered to the shops in January (year þ2). An exception was possible for specific finished products like haute couture, which required very small volumes of fabric, meaning that the period between production and delivery was shorter.
As the industries' innovation and purchase processes were the same in each European country, competition was fierce (Power and Jansson 2008) . As a result, these three fairs had to take place in Western Europe in the same period. At the start of the 1960s, Messe Frankfurt had greatly benefited from the German ''economic miracle'' (Wirtschaftswunder), that is, Germany's rapid and spectacular recovery after 1950, with annual growth rates of over 10% (Braun 2011, p. 170) . The second Interstoff event in January 1960 registered a record total of 4,757 buyers from 22 countries. Yet, at that time, the French and Italian economies were not flourishing, and their economic miracles happened later, in the 1960s (Eichengreen 2007) .
In 1964, the Interstoff event covered 22,000 m 2 and hosted 430 exhibitors. Table 1 portrays the formidable growth of this fair during the 1960s, the amount of exhibition space, and the breakdown of the number of exhibitors and buyers and their geographical origins. It also shows the event's growing internationalization in this period. In fact, growing numbers of exhibitors and buyers were coming from abroad to Frankfurt, and Interstoff was the place to be for discovering ''what was going to be hot'' the following season. The recently established Parisian fashion prediction companies thus also had to go to Frankfurt to keep up-to-date (Maillet 2013 ). Interstoff's rapid growth led to it becoming the number one trade fair worldwide, and the Parisian MTI event was duly abandoned in 1964 (Catin 1963) . However, from 1960 onwards, Italian silk manufacturers organized their own trade fair, SetaComo, with exclusive access for high-end Italian producers. The event was a success for these silk manufacturers, but the French were prohibited from exhibiting (Interview Brochier 2014). As a result, after the end of the MTI shows in Paris in 1964, French manufacturers were looking for new ways to develop their businesses internationally and collectively. What is more, although they exhibited at Interstoff, they wanted a more select approach for their high-end products in dedicated markets, which they termed ''mini-markets.'' Accordingly, 15 silk industrialists led by Bernard Dupasquier, Secretary of the French Silk Federation, organized Expomoda in Barcelona in May 1969 to present their new products and designs to 200 Spanish buyers (LMT, June 1969, pp. 30-32) . Five months later, the same industrialists invited the British specialist press to Lyon for a preview of their new lines (LMT, December 1969, p. 21) . As a result, in spring 1972, when one of the 15, Robert Brochier, came up with the idea of attracting high-end buyers from Parisian haute couture houses, his friends and competitors were all enthusiastic. It is also possible Bernard Dupasquier suggested this idea.
Meanwhile, by the end of the 1960s, the Italians had been unable to reconfigure several of their trade fair ventures (SetaComo, MITAM), which had become too small to compete internationally. Interstoff was therefore on its own when it came to convincing the vast majority of textile and fashion executives that its bi-annual show in Frankfurt was the place to be. As a result, French high-end manufacturers were looking for a dedicated fair to present their fabrics in a more select environment than at Interstoff, where everyone was exhibiting.
Premiè re Vision Takes the Lead in Europe, 1972 Europe, -2010 The French manufacturers referred to above were all entrepreneurs from the silk cluster in Lyon. Some were managing family firms that had been established in the 18th or 19th centuries (Miller and Sargenston 1996) . None of them, though, had ever organized a trade fair, and they were concerned about the process. Fortunately, the two recent founders of the French hotel chain Novotel wanted a route into a more prestigious subsector, and planned a new hotel in Lyon under the umbrella of its four star brand Sofitel (Bozek 2010) . In 1972, this hotel was brand new, built along the Rhône, and the most attractive venue in town. It was therefore chosen as the location for the first Première Vision event.
This first Premie`re Vision de la haute nouveaute´event in Lyon was a great success, with the numerous buyers from Parisian haute couture houses especially appreciative, as it helped them to see new fabrics and designs as late as possible:
November 1973 for the 1974-75 winter season (13 months instead of 18). Moreover, as these haute couture houses were only looking for small amounts of textiles, their main bargaining tool was their suggestion they would use the fabrics already chosen by the major ready-to-wear companies if the terms on offer were unsuitable. Furthermore, as they were the last buyers to choose their suppliers, they could demand exclusive offers. This was unlike the position with the big shows such as Interstoff, where logistics issues were crucial and the textiles needed to be seen as early as possible. In Lyon, however, the objective was to be the final exhibition of the season to set the tone for what was to come the following season. To achieve this, the 15 industrialists chose one unique and common ''color card'' with the idea being that: ''as we are the ultimate show in the season, we have to make it easier for our clients and ourselves to direct the selection process through a tunnel of choice'' (Interview Brunel and Brochier 2014).
As a result of their initial success, these manufacturers organized the fair again, but after two editions faced the same problem as other fashion events outside Paris. It needed to move north to the capital, confirming the significance of creative cities (Cohendet and Zapata 2009) . Nevertheless, the founders stuck to their invitation-only principle and the selection process they had chosen at the start in Lyon. The move to Paris was symbolic in a country where the best-selling book on economic geography Paris and the French Desert (Gravier 1947 ) was published in 1947. Still closely connected to the Sofitel management team, the organizers settled in another brand new hotel in Paris from 1974-78, the Sofitel Sévres near the Porte de Versailles, which was where the number one trade show in the world for the ready-to-wear industry took place: Le salon du preˆt-a`-porter.
Relocating to Paris was not Première Vision's only change. Its founders also invited other French manufacturers of cotton, wool, and linen fabrics to join them. From that moment on, Première Vision was no longer a Lyon, or a select silk trade, event. It became a national trade fair and, in 1978, its organizers decided to fully integrate with Le salon du preˆt-a`-porter. As Première Vision was managed as an association, these men also relinquished their management of the fair's sales and production arms to the management company of the premises of the Porte de Versailles, which belonged to the Paris Chamber of Commerce Comite´d'Organisation de la Ville de Paris (COVP).
In addition, the association hoped to increase its appeal beyond its primary clients, the haute couture houses, to the bulk of the market, namely, the ready-to-wear manufacturers. As a consequence, starting in 1980, the French organizers began to invite manufacturers from other European countries, starting with the British, even though the Italian industry was more important at the time. This decision was a response to French companies not being invited to either the MITAM or SetaComo fairs in the 1960s. It was also because the Italians were France's main competitors, and were, ultimately, much more successful. Despite this, Italian manufacturers became the key clients of Première Vision during the 1980s and 90s (Rinallo and Golfetto 2006) . Nonetheless, even though the move to join Le salon du preˆt-a`-porter had been a success in terms of raising awareness, the exhibitors were not particularly happy since the ready-towear firms came to the show to sell, not buy. As explained by economists, for vertical integration in trade shows, it is crucial that the role of each participant not be confused. One cannot be a seller in one hall and a buyer in another at the same time. ''Trade shows are spaces specifically designed and organized to facilitate exchanges between actors'' (Torre 2008, p. 881) .
In 1984, the Paris Chamber of Commerce opened a second landmark arena for exhibitions in the north of the city in Villepinte, close to the new major airport, Charles de Gaulle. The founders of Première Vision seized this opportunity to again become independent of the COVP management company, taking a risk by occupying these new premises outside the city center. Yet, even though this new location was not well received by either the French or the international business community, who praised the Porte de Versailles venue, the move ultimately proved to be a wise one. In addition, Première Vision soon established its own management structure and hired a general manager, Jacques Brunel, who came from the Lyon area where he had been running a family-owned business in the fashion industry. Table 2 shows that the number of exhibitors and visitors at Première Vision increased spectacularly from 1974 to the end of the 1990s, as did the floor space. Meanwhile, Table 3 clearly sets out the rates of growth from 1972 to 2000, which clearly indicate that 1999 was Première Vision's best year.
There were multiple reasons, both internal and external, and at three levels, from the micro to the macro, for the impressive growth in sales for Première Vision between 1986 and 1992. One is that Première Vision had only two general managers in 41 years . Indeed, all the firm's teams have remained very loyal, and it was no surprise when researching this article to meet employees who had spent more than 20 years in the same department. The general manager, Bernard Dupasquier, had gathered a dedicated team around him in two separate locations. The general administration office was managed from Lyon as a locally embedded back-office. Meanwhile, in Paris, Dupasquier recruited staff with a high profile and numerous fashion connections, with Micheline Alland, the head of the style bureau, being a key example. As Première Vision was moving to the outskirts of Paris, Dupasquier understood that he had to increase the appeal of his show. Moreover, the European fashion industry was becoming increasingly geared towards innovation, and its textile counterpart had to follow suit (Ternaux 2006) . Alland thus contracted a young and talented Dutch trend forecaster, Lidewij Edelkoort, to organize trend shows with dedicated movies known as the Le Film de la mode (the movie of fashion) to forecast fashion trends. This was a huge success, and from 1985-1996 visitors to Première Vision remember Edelkoort's shows as ''extraordinary moments'' that were not on offer at Interstoff in the same period (Interview Belloir 2013).
Micheline Alland was not new to the style bureau business. She had previously worked at the Comite´des Industries de la Mode (CIM), the trade bureau launched in 1955 by the French ready-to-wear trade association (Fe´de´ration du veˆtement feminin). The launch of the CIM resulted from a French productivity mission to the U.S. in spring 1955 (Kuisel 1988 (Kuisel , 1993 . A collective suggestion made after the trip was to foster a concertation mechanism between the entire chain of manufacturing and distribution, including the media and, especially, fashion magazines.
The head of the CIM was Dominique Peclers, who had launched her own style bureau in Paris in 1970. The role of the CIM was to suggest new trends to manufacturers each season, and to convince retailers they had to adopt these new ideas after the press was convinced of their appeal. As a result, when Première Vision recruited Alland, she had already experimented with the role of a style bureau at the trade level. The CIM soon became superfluous, though, as private ventures were taking the lead in the new fashion prediction business (Haufler 2013; Mazzucato 2013) . Indeed, several style bureaus were launched in Paris at the end of the 1960s, while a new generation of young stylists established their own bureaus in 1985-86. Michèle Alland, meanwhile, transferred her style know-how to the trade fair business, implementing the style and trendsetting techniques she had practiced at the CIM. Ultimately, these techniques became commonplace for the entire industry. In its own right, Première Vision implemented its own style bureau, and put a concertation mechanism into place that had been familiar to the French fashion and textile industries for the previous 30 years. The diffusion of specific know-how (trend forecasting) from a trade organization to a trade fair through several private ventures is a clear example of the dissemination of a collective innovation via marketing (Table 4) .
In 1997, Première Vision established its International Observatory for Trends and Style. For Rinallo and Golfetto (2006) , this was the landmark launch of a new practice for a trade fair: a ''(concertation) mechanism (is) a set of normative and representational practices that, literally, make markets'' (p. 867). Their analysis gives the lead to the fabric companies that collectively developed the ability to define trends. In doing so, these companies provide significant inputs for the firms and designers that are commonly believed to drive the fashion process. These fabric companies are mainly the market leaders from France and Italy, which dominate in terms of the fabrics produced for the fine-fashion industry worldwide, despite the greater than ever price competition from East Asian producers (Rinallo and Golfetto 2006, p. 857) . In their concertation mechanism, Rinallo and Golfetto attribute the main role to the fabric companies, and, to a certain extent, neglect the other firms involved in the fashion process. These other companies belong to two categories: industrial and services. As a piece of cloth is a combination of three elements (color, design, and material), the concertation mechanism embraces representatives of three contributors (fabric companies provide the material, but the two other types of contributor should also be included).
First, as Regina Blaszczyk shows in her book The Color Revolution (2012), chemical companies have played a central role since the end of the 19th century in a ''set of normative and representational practices that, literally, make markets'' (Rinallo and Golfetto 2006, p. 867) . Second, a design is not exclusive to brand designers, but instead involves an array of independent designers that have flourished in major creative centers, especially Lyon and Paris, since the 17th century (Miller and Sargenston 1996) . Third, Rinallo and Golfetto neglect the role of dedicated mediators like the style bureaus from the 1950s-80s, or indeed that of Première Vision following its move to Villepinte in 1984 and its recruitment of Micheline Alland. In a 1979 article, Women's Wear Daily was already underlining the role of Première Vision as a trendsetter for North American buyers and designers. ''Numerous US and Canadian buyers and designers visited the fair. Louis Chevalier, the 'Montreal designer', found it extremely useful for sampling and trendsetting before the final purchase designs he'd make at Interstoff next month'' (WWD, April 16, 1979) .
Following Première Vision's arrival in Paris, the style bureaus became very active in the management of new trends on the floor of the trade fair. However, Rinallo and Golfetto seem to regard the trade-show as a neutral location vs. a cultural encounter, and therefore not as a powerful venue for the ''dissemination of knowledge'' (Maskell, Barthlet, and Malmberg 2006) . Première Vision has been able to adapt the Parisian historical knowledge of trendsetting to its trade show (see Figure 2) . Indeed, it capitalized on its appeal in order to consolidate the presence of European manufacturers, especially Italian ones, while Interstoff was opening new fairs in Asia.
At the February 2004 edition of Première Vision, 339 of the 706 exhibitors were Italian (48%) and 137 (19%) were French (Rinallo and Golfetto 2006, p. 861) . This overrepresentation of France and Italy can be interpreted in two ways. The most widespread reading of competitors is to insist on a common understanding of a joint-interest: the major luxury brands in the world are either French or Italian, and the preservation of their appeal is linked to some sort of favoritism from their major providers. European brands account for 70% of the luxury goods industry's global sales (Frontier 2012) . Première Vision's concertation mechanism could therefore be explained by the preservation of a common industrial heritage, a sort of cultural European favoritism. A second interpretation is more global and linked to the value given to European textiles at an international level. French recognition is required and Paris claims that it is still the place to be for medium to high-end fabrics from anywhere in the world. Yet, Première Vision's success cannot be reduced to its unique concertation mechanism, as this was nothing new to the fashion and textile community in France.
The major presence of French and Italian exhibitors at Première Vision can also be explained by the financial incentives they received. National administrations in the two countries (industry ministries) subsidized up to 50% of the total exhibition costs of their companies. What is more, in Italy, a unique condition was the involvement in the event of all the members of one fashion industry trade association. This meant that either an entire group of companies would participate in Première Vision or none of them. As a result, the pressure was From the early 1970s, the market for textile suppliers was becoming increasingly competitive, with new arrivals from low-cost countries, particularly Asia. At the end of the 1980s, Messe Frankfurt -more than 10 years before Première Vision -adapted its strategy according to global macro-economic conditions, and began to look for opportunities on the world market. In fall 1987, Messe Frankfurt put on its first fair outside Germany, in Hong Kong. This was branded Interstoff Asia. It was, nonetheless, no coincidence that this fabric fair followed the global shift in manufacturing, because the textile industry happened to be the first to rapidly source in Asia. As one director of Messe Frankfurt, Michael Scherpe, put it: ''it followed a general relocation of textile manufacturing industry at the time, in particular to Asia '' (Interview Scherpe 2013) .
During the 1970s and 80s, textile production shifted from Europe to Asia. Table 5 shows the changing geography of the global textile industry from 1960 to 1980. Clearly, the industry in the developed economies lost a lot of ground to developing countries with lower labor costs. In particular, the Asian textile industry expanded rapidly during this period. This shift of manufacturing locations also had consequences for the textile markets and, especially, the textile and fabric fairs in Europe.
Interstoff Asia show was a success right from the start. Until 1994, it was managed from the firm's headquarters in Frankfurt, but due to its success, a holding company, Messe Frankfurt (HK) Ltd, was established in Hong Kong. At the time, Hong Kong was also seen as a hub for entering the Asian growth markets, particularly China's mainland, which had staggering growth figures of 18-24% (HAMF 2000a). Messe Frankfurt (HK)'s mid-term aim was to enter the Chinese market as soon as it opened up to foreign investors. Although Interstoff Asia remained the most important show for the Hong Kong affiliate, it also began to organize other fairs, including Interyarn, Interior, and Pen & Paper. This was a major difference with Première Vision. Although the organization of textile apparel fairs had been an important activity of Messe Frankfurt since 1959, and increasingly so on a global scale, the organization of consumer goods fairs had never been its core business.
In fall 1995, Messe Frankfurt (HK) and the Chinese Subcouncil of the Textile Industry (CCPIT) set up Intertextile -a Chinese international trade fair for apparel fabrics, home textiles, and accessories -in Shanghai. The show grew rapidly in size and importance, and became China's foremost international textile event within five years (HAMF 2000b) . According to a report from the organizers in 2000, market conditions for the fair were excellent, as Chinese consumers constantly increased their spending on clothing and interior decoration. China remained:
The world's largest textile manufacturer, but, due to sluggish development in technology and equipment, the quality and design of its fabrics are behind those of its Western counterparts -meaning huge opportunities for foreign textile manufacturers and exporters.
It is also the single largest garment producer in the world, using around 20 billion meters of fabric a year for clothing manufacture -a quarter of which is imported from overseas. The high quality of imported fabrics, in terms of quality, dying color, hand-feel, design and pattern, means that they are used predominantly for clothing destined for export; equating to 40% of total production, worth around US$30 billion per year (HAMF 2000b). Moreover, the Chinese domestic market consumed growing amounts of imported textiles, as increasing numbers of Chinese consumers were willing to spend on high-end brands made with high-quality fabrics. In other words, according to the organizers, the Chinese textile market had become very interesting for Western high-quality textile manufacturers: globalization was not just one-way traffic. In 2001, due to the huge success of the Shanghai fair, Messe Frankfurt (HK) and CCPIT set up an Intertextile spring fair in Beijing to serve the north Chinese market (HAMF 2000c) . The Chinese apparel fairs became very successful in the 2000s in terms of the number of exhibitors and visitors. Indeed, in 2012, these fairs had 4,308 exhibitors and 90,122 visitors, 18,206 of whom were from overseas (20%) (HAMF 2012). These figures not only dwarf the scale of Interstoff Asia in Hong Kong, but also that of all other major European shows like Première Vision, although the latter attracted a much greater percentage of foreign exhibitors (around 80% in 2006) .
During the 1990s, Interstoff Frankfurt, despite still being the largest fashion fabric fair in the world at the time, was losing ground to Première Vision. In the early 1990s, clients began to complain about the dates of the Interstoff events. Interviewed at the Frankfurt fair in 1993, the Italian manufacturer Mario Brachi stated that although German clients were very reliable, he did not think he would return to Interstoff the following year because all major deals were made three weeks earlier in Paris at Première Vision (HAMF 1993) . Textil Wirtschaft, a major German trade journal, was also not convinced by the glitter and glamour of the 70th Interstoff fair: ''quantity has nothing to do with quality.'' A total of 1203 exhibitors and 24,000 visitors looked impressive, according to the journal, but the absence of Italian and French manufacturers of high quality and fashion fabrics wouldn't encourage other exhibitors to return (TW 1993) .
By the mid-1990s, Messe Frankfurt was organizing nine fabric fairs around the world (HAMF 1996a, p. 1). In Europe, however, European manufacturers increasingly seemed to prefer Première Vision. One of the main reasons for this was that some Europeans criticized Interstoff for offering a platform to Asian, and particularly Chinese, manufacturers. Indeed, European manufacturers were increasingly looking to adopt a protectionist business strategy, which Première Vision was pursuing at the time (TM 1995) . Yet adopting a similar approach would have gone directly against Messe Frankfurt's internationalization strategy and the economic principles of free trade to which it adhered. As a result, Messe Frankfurt was gaining an ever larger market share worldwide, while simultaneously losing ground in Europe.
Messe Frankfurt's management did not, however, pursue a wait-and-see policy, but actively tried to turn the tide with an offensive strategy. The company's recently appointed managing director, Michael Peters, who had a Ph.D. in marketing, was closely involved with Interstoff's policy regarding Première Vision. He was committed to maintaining the event's foremost position by innovating in the existing shows and setting up new ones (WWD 1995) . In 1995, Messe Frankfurt thus set up a new, small, and exclusive fair in the Sheraton Hotel near the airport, called ''Take Off.'' Weeks before Première Vision's event, 36 key European exhibitors were invited to a fair in February 1995, with the invitation based on exclusivity. Normally, manufacturers would visit their best clients to collect the first orders, which would take them a few weeks. Now, though, they could invite their clients to Frankfurt and make deals in two days, ultimately saving time and money as a result. Clearly, this was an attempt to compete with Première Vision using its own ammunition by being the prime show in the season and exclusive. One German trade journal commented:
Clearly the background of this new event is that despite the fact that Frankfurt, with ''Interstoff,'' organizes the biggest fair in the world, many garment manufacturers prefer the Paris fair because of its early date. Some exhibitors also criticized the fact that Interstoff serves as a platform for Far Eastern competition. Première Vision, on the other hand, has restricted itself -at least officially -towards European exhibitors (TM 1995). Nevertheless, Take Off did not become what Peters had expected. The attendance was too low and the organization needed at least 50 to 60 exhibitors to break-even. Moreover, the visitors were mainly from Germany, and not France or Italy. As a consequence, the new show was shelved.
A year later, Peters stated in a press release that the fashion pipeline was changing rapidly, with 60% of the European textile business already being based on direct imports, while the delivery time to small and medium-sized firms producing inexpensive ''ready-to-wear'' items had become shorter. To deliver ''just in time'' and the right fabrics had thus become a reality to which the textile fairs had to adapt (HAMF 1996a, p. 4) . Consequently, in 1996, Messe Frankfurt split its Interstoff show into two events, Interstoff World and Interstoff Season, both of which would be organized in the spring and fall. At Interstoff World, garment manufacturers could make their first selections and order basic products like suits and skirts, as well as very fashionable new lines for early delivery. Interstoff World was also positioned as the first fair of the season in Europe (before Première Vision), and was presenting competent and reliable trend information about colors, fabrics, and silhouettes for the fall/winter season of 1997/98, as well as putting on a pre-show for the summer season of 1998 (HAMF 1996a, p. 5) . Also, 34 design studios from 11 countries under the umbrella of the ''Ideas Group'' showed the latest trends in the sportswear segment at Interstoff World in fall 1996 (HAMF 1996b) .
Interstoff Season, meanwhile, was organized later, and was intended to give garment manufacturers the chance to make their second selections for a second line in the season, and to pick out the very latest trends. Trend prediction was organized under the umbrella of a so-called Trend Focus (HAMF 1996c) . Of course, trend prediction was not new for Interstoff. Indeed, as early as the 1960s, European textile manufacturers and confectionaries had visited the show in Frankfurt to see the latest trends. However, fashion prediction had become increasingly explicit at the Interstoff shows since the 1980s. During the 1990s, the information function of textile fairs had become crucial for an event's success. Since Première Vision had seemed to usurp Interstoff's position in this regard, the latter was focusing and advertising its trend activities ever more explicitly.
In the press release referred to above, Michael Peters also announced that Messe Frankfurt had signed an agreement with Première Vision (Paris) and S.I.Tex (Milan) in July 1996 to jointly organize an early trend fair in Nice and Como the following year. This was named EuroPremière. According to Messe's managing director: ''The proliferation in the European fair landscape should be stopped with our joined forces. '' (HAMF 1996a, p. 6 ). This joint effort was, however, shortlived. The last combined event took place in 1999, after which the Italians no longer wanted to share the spoils, according to Première Vision's general director Jacques Brunel (Interview Brunel 2013) . Despite the fact that Interstoff had set up fairs before Première Vision, and had also hired several style bureaus, for example, Ornella Bignami's Elementi Moda, and design studios, the high-end market in Europe seemed to be lost to the French (see Figure 3) . In 1999, Messe Frankfurt's management team therefore decided to skip the next Interstoff show in Frankfurt, instead aiming to organize a new event in 2000 based on sports and outdoor wear, although this was also not an immediate success.
In 2002, Messe Frankfurt acquired Daniel Rubenstein's Texworld in Paris, and began to compete with Première Vision in its own fashion ecosystem. Rubenstein had set up Texworld five years earlier as a off show benefiting from the appeal of Première Vision. As is well known in the art business, off exhibitions try to take advantage of rising stars, but in the meantime reinforce the overall appeal of exhibitions in a particular location (Becker 1982 Table 2 ). China was represented by a group of 127 exhibitors, India by 108, South Korea by 93, Taiwan by 82, Turkey by 77, and Thailand by 47, highlighting that the majority (80%) were still coming from Asia. The visitors (and buyers), on the other hand, mainly came from Europe (76 percent), and included fabric and garment manufacturers, designers, purchasing groups, and distributors (HAMF 2006) .
Conclusion
The analysis of a relatively recent business phenomenon (fashion fabric trade fairs) gains from a historical perspective. At the macro-level, it has been demonstrated that the textile and fashion industries were still able to develop in Europe after the relocation of the greater part of textile manufacturing to other continents. Both Première Vision and Interstoff flourished against the odds: they expanded and contributed to the success of fashion trade fairs as ''knowledge intermediaries'' (Haufler 2013 ). At the meso-level, as suggested by Rinallo and Golfetto (2006) , this article shows that Première Vision was able to use a concertation mechanism to establish its successful model based on a close interaction between buyers and sellers, especially Italian companies. This mechanism was not, however, completely new to the French fashion industry; it had formed part of the fashion prediction methodology since the mid-1950s. As a consequence, the mechanism could fall under the onesolution-explains-all approach. The fashion and textile industries were fully involved in this mechanism as mediators. However, this cannot conceal the role of other contributors like the trade press and fashion prediction companies, especially the Parisian style bureaus that were dominant in the 1970s-90s.
The discussion of the concertation mechanism has highlighted the role of information flows during the expansion of the two fabric fairs. Première Vision and Interstoff confirmed the contribution of external information as a key element of their development. The former's gains on the European market may thus have come from a higher degree of responsiveness to information about its clients and visitors. Not only did trade fairs play a crucial role in the dissemination of knowledge, but also the efficiency of this distribution was linked to the information-orientation level of the location. In other words, the more information-related the location (Paris, Frankfurt, Shanghai) , the more important the concertation mechanism.
Even though Première Vision and Interstoff have followed very distinctive paths, the two trade fairs became central locations for the spread of important information to the industry, albeit on a different scale: the concertation mechanism became embedded in Première Vision's strategy, but this did not happen to the same extent at Interstoff.
As early as 1979, five years after its arrival in Paris and 20 years before the formal establishment of the concertation mechanism, Première Vision was already perceived as a trendsetting location. Consequently, the main goal for Première Vision's management team during the 1980s was twofold: insisting on its already growing trendsetting positioning, and widening the array of fabric manufacturers to include nonFrench companies. This was a combination of a complementary marketing and sales strategy, with the aim being to convince visitors that Première Vision was not only a location for trendsetting, but also for buying.
As a consequence, if trade fairs are active locations for spreading knowledge via true dissemination mechanisms (Bathelt, Rinallo, and Golfetto 2014) , they should not be over-estimated as exclusive central pivots. Accordingly, the terms of the competition between the two fairs should be related to the extent to which they were able to be as information-related as required by their environment: more so in Paris than in Frankfurt, and more in Frankfurt than in Shanghai. Consequently, a firm's capacity to develop a trade fair could be related at the micro-level to its know-how in trade fair management, at the meso-level to its knowledge in terms of being information-oriented, and at the macro-level to its ability to expand into new markets.
The explanations for this difference of scale can be found in the structure of each company and the role of its ownership. Première Vision was an autonomous entity with private and associative interests, and was exclusively dedicated to organizing fairs for the textile industries. Nowadays, Messe Frankfurt organizes more than 100 trade fairs worldwide, including textile fairs. Until 1999, Interstoff represented only a small part of its entire business. Although Messe Frankfurt was completely in the hands of the public sector (the City of Frankfurt had 60% and the State of Hesse 40%), the company was always run as a private venture aiming to make a profit by renting out floor space, and not necessarily for fashion fabrics. The difference between the two fairs could be summarized as that the Frankfurt Messe is a venue in search of industries that could arrange trade fairs, while the opposite could be said of Première Vision.
Finally, at first glance, it could be concluded that Première Vision had won the competition with Interstoff by focusing exclusively on its core market (Europe). This does, however, completely miss the point that Interstoff's move to China may have been a clever decision, as the growth rate in the last 30 years in Asia has been significantly higher than in Europe. Furthermore, Interstoff has contributed to the geographical expansion of the fashion and textile industries to China. It has also supported Chinese firms in terms of them becoming major actors on the world stage. This expansion, however, was not the only possible strategy, as European firms, especially those from Italy and France, have been able to resist Chinese competition through an up-scaling strategy that is embedded in Première Vision's high-end European positioning. Interstoff and Première Vision have contributed to different growth paths for different, but to some extent, complementary, segments of the industry. The comparative historical analysis of these two major trade fairs confirms, first, the role of the dissemination of knowledge in the expansion process of the fashion industry, and, second, that this process takes various routes.
From a macromarketing perspective, the comparative analysis shows that these two different strategies can be pursued simultaneously within the same industry. The exclusive approach to concentrating and intensifying a core business (Première Vision) versus the market-led approach of investing in a growing market segment (Interstoff) cannot be analyzed without an in-depth understanding of the resources that the firms were able to mobilize.
This comparative study of Première Vision and Interstoff shows that beyond a shared willingness to impose themselves as the favorite gatekeeper for the fashion and textile industries, the two trade-fairs entered a competitive race that is still going on. The outcomes of their competition may change with the progressive integration of Première Vision as the upscale fashion and textile trade-fair organization worldwide, while Interstoff concentrates on the Chinese market. Further research is therefore needed to see whether Première Vision may actually have possessed the wisdom to expand into Asia, but failed to find the required capital, while Interstoff was dedicated to following Première Vision's investment in trendsetting, but was unsuccessful in terms of finding the perfect team in Frankfurt to do this, as it was not part of the Parisian fashion ecosystem.
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